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The powers of the prosecution service in South Africa are extensive, 
particularly when it comes to the exercise of its discretion to institute 
criminal proceedings, to negotiate plea and sentence agreements and 
to divert matters from the criminal process. A court cannot prevent a 
prosecutor from withdrawing a matter or from accepting a specific 
plea. It is the state that remains dominus litis.2 However it will be suf-
ficient for the purposes of this paper to focus on how the prosecution 
service exercises its power when it negotiates a plea and sentence bar-
gain and then to examine and determine the usefulness, fairness and 
the constitutionality of this process after 994.3
In common law criminal justice systems the process of plea bargain-
ing has for long been an established practice used by both the pros-
ecution and the defence. In South Africa which in as far as its criminal 
procedure is concerned can be classed as a common law system,4 the 
practice of negotiation prior to the plea was not regulated by any 
statute or policy and was seldom labelled as ‘plea-bargaining’. It lacked 
formal recognition as a pre-trial procedure that fulfilled a specific func-
tion in the criminal process. Prosecutors are in a position to withdraw 
charges and stop prosecutions without any questions being asked by 
the judiciary as to what informed the decision.5 Personal experience 
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suggests that the exercise of such prosecutorial discretion in a majority 
of cases is as a result of informal plea negotiations or representations 
that are made by the defence to the prosecutor to intervene in this 
way.6
This informal and longstanding practice of plea-bargaining was for-
malised in 200 when the South African Criminal Procedure Act7 was 
amended to include a new provision, s 05A. In essence, the section 
codifies the practice of negotiated pleas and at the same time intro-
duces sentence agreements. The provision can be used for all criminal 
offences including rape and murder.
Hitherto plea-bargaining has not enjoyed undivided academic sup-
port and has been labelled by some scholars as morally suspect, 
unethical and offensive to the principles of justice.8 Others view plea 
bargaining as a procedure that provides unusual opportunities for lazy 
practitioners whose aim it is to take short cuts en route to finishing as 
many cases per day in pursuit of a greater income.9
Given the extraordinary powers of the prosecution service in 
exercising prosecutorial discretion in South Africa it is important to 
acknowledge that prosecutors are capable of negotiating an agreement 
by threatening accused persons with the maximum sentence that could 
be imposed. In light of this plea bargaining does potentially pose some 
risk whereby innocent people may admit guilt in cases in which they 
are not guilty in order to avoid maximum punishment.
With scholars expressing strong sentiments against plea-bargaining it 
is necessary to examine the procedure in South Africa in closer detail. 
Can one hold that there is merit in these opposing views particularly 
at a time when the South African criminal justice system is burdened 
with a heavy backlog0 of cases? Is the practice not rather a pragmatic 
tool in order to deal with these case backlogs?
It is against this backdrop that this paper will examine the process 
of plea-bargaining in South Africa. Its uses or abuses will be looked at 
and then a determination will be made as to whether the process can 
be fairly labelled as offensive or whether it should rather be adopted 
6 The author bases this statement on fifteen years of experience in the Department of 
Justice, working as a prosecutor, senior prosecutor and magistrate in various magiste-
rial districts in the Western Cape.
7 Act 5 of 977. Hereafter ‘the Criminal Procedure Act’. 
8 See J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) at 6.
9 See AW Alschuler ‘Implementing the criminal defendant’s right to trial: alternatives to 
the plea bargaining system’ (983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 93 at 933.
0 At the end of March 2006 the backlog of cases in the district court was a total of 
36 95 cases (9% of the outstanding roll of 97 404 cases) and in the regional court 
a total of 20 252 cases (42% of the outstanding roll of 47 83 cases) at March 2006. 
See National Prosecuting Authority National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 
2005/2006 (2006) at 9.
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on the grounds of pragmatism. For the sake of completeness plea bar-
gaining will be discussed as it exists in its traditional sense coupled 
with the newly adopted statutory procedure.
Right at the outset it should be acknowledged that plea bargaining has 
been used with great success in countries like the United States of America 
as a reliable and practical way to clear case backlogs. Whatever its wider 
shortcomings may be the process is clearly an instrument that eases the 
burden on justice systems and provides flexibility in sentencing.
2. Types of plea-bargaining
In order to understand what can be negotiated in terms of a plea bargain 
agreement it is important to define the concept plea-bargaining and in 
doing so to also examine how it is defined in the law of other countries.
In the United States of America plea-bargaining is defined as follows:
‘Plea bargaining consists of the exchange of official concessions for a 
defendant’s act of self conviction. Those concessions may relate to the sen-
tence imposed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor, the offence 
charged, or a variety of other circumstances; they may be explicit or implicit 
and they may proceed from any number of officials.’2
In an article in the 980s South African scholars defined it as:
‘the practice of relinquishing the right to go to trial in exchange for a reduc-
tion in charge and/or sentence.’3
Regardless of which definition is preferred plea bargaining remains 
a process exercised before the trial where both parties can negotiate 
some benefit which will be in the interests of justice, provided that the 
accused pleads guilty to the negotiated charge as per the agreement. 
Plea bargaining can also be seen as a type of alternative dispute reso-
lution. One of the most transformative criminal justice systems, the 
system used in Chile, albeit an inquisitorial system, views plea-bargain-
ing as a type of alternative dispute resolution. The process consists of 
negotiations between the prosecution and the defence and a complete 
disclosure of all the evidence takes place, and the final agreement is 
handed to the judge who has the final control over the sentence and 
who then also reviews the evidence.4 Interestingly plea-bargaining 
 See South African Law Commission Fourth Interim Report (Project 73) Simplification 
of Criminal Procedure (Sentence Agreements) (200) at page .
2 AW Alschuler ‘Plea bargaining and its history’ (979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. (979) . For 
a comprehensive list of definitions see the South African Law Commission Fourth 
Interim Report (Project 73) op cit (n) at 20 et seq.
3 N Isakow and D Van Zyl Smit ‘Negotiated justice and the legal context’ (985) 4 De 
Rebus 73.
4 See R Blanco, R Hutt and H Rojas ‘Reform to the criminal justice system in Chile: 
evaluation and challenges’ (2005) 2 Loy. Chi. Int’l. L. Rev. 256 at 258.
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in countries like Chile and Italy is not permitted in cases that carry a 
severe penalty.5 In comparison the process of plea bargaining in South 
Africa is not limited and can be used for all offences.
3. Developments in England
Until very recently plea bargaining in England was very restricted. 
While the defence and the prosecution could negotiate there was to 
be no bargaining with the judge, nor could there be any indication of 
sentence from the judge. This principle which had been formally rec-
ognised since the 970s was derived from R v Turner6 which as the 
following extract indicates held that while counsel may give advice, 
which includes the likely sentence on a guilty plea, such information 
was impermissible coming from the court itself:
The judge should, subject to the one exception referred hereafter, never indi-
cate the sentence which he is minded to impose. A statement that, on a plea 
of guilty, he would impose one sentence but that, on conviction following a 
plea of not guilty, he would impose a severer sentence is one which should 
never be made. This could be taken to be undue pressure on the accused, 
thus depriving him of the complete freedom of choice essential.7
As can be clearly seen the position in England was that sentence indica-
tion was not permitted on the basis that it impacted unduly on the free 
will of the accused in his consideration of what plea should be tendered.
This restrictive approach has changed recently. In R v Goodyear8 the 
Court of Appeal reconsidered its hard and fast position on sentence 
indication by the judge. The court drew a distinction between an unso-
5 In Chile it is only permitted for crimes carrying a penalty of less than 5 years imprison-
ment and in Italy for crimes carrying a sentence of less than 7½ years imprisonment. 
For a more detailed discussion of the Italian system see WT Pizzi and M Montagna ‘The 
Battle to establish an adversarial trial system in Italy’ (2004) 25 Mich. J. Int’l. L 429.
6 (970) 2 All ER 28.
7 Turner supra (n6) at 285.
8 (2005) 3 All ER 7. The facts of this case were as follows: G and his co-accused were 
workmen who developed a corrupt relationship with a council official, S, in relation to 
building work on council properties. G did not obtain work that would otherwise have 
been withheld from him, but rather paid out £3000 and did free work to ‘keep S sweet’ 
so that S would give them an easy ride in evaluating the quality of their work. The trial 
judge was initially reluctant to give G’s counsel any indication of sentence, but upon 
being assured by both counsel that the case would be presented on the basis that G 
had not directly gained a corrupt benefit, the judge opined that ‘this is not a custody 
case’. This having been relayed back to G, he changed his plea to guilty. However, after 
receiving further reports, the judge proceeded to sentence G to 6 months imprisonment 
suspended for two years and a £ 000 fine. The judge explained that he had meant to 
indicate that this was not a case for immediate custody. The appeal provided an oppor-
tunity to Lord Woolf CJ to reconsider the basic principles regarding sentence indica-
tions that had been previously established in Turner.
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licited indication of sentence from the judge and a deliberate request 
from an accused for an indication of the sentence:
‘In our judgment, there is a significant distinction between a sentence indica-
tion given to a defendant who has deliberately chosen to seek it from the 
judge, and an unsolicited indication directed at him from the judge, and 
conveyed to him by his counsel. We do not see why a judicial response to a 
request for information from the defendant should automatically be deemed 
to constitute improper pressure on him. The judge is simply acceding to 
the defendant’s wish to be fully informed before making his own decision 
whether to plead guilty or not guilty, by having the judge’s views about 
sentence available to him rather than the advice counsel may give him about 
what counsel believes the judge’s view would be likely to be.9 
 … In effect, this simply substitutes the defendant’s legitimate reliance on 
counsel’s assessment of the likely sentence with the more accurate indication 
provided by the judge himself. In such circumstances, the prohibition against 
the judge giving an unsolicited sentence indication would not be contravened, 
and any subsequent plea, whether guilty or not guilty, would be voluntary. 
Accordingly it would not constitute inappropriate judicial pressure on the 
defendant for the judge to respond to such a request if one were made.’20
It is my submission that in England at present there is even a greater 
impetus to negotiate a sentence indication in light of the recent guide-
lines set by the Sentencing Guidelines Council suggesting that defend-
ants who plead guilty should be rewarded with shorter sentences. This 
means that even violent criminals would be able to ensure a lighter 
sentence in cases where the evidence against them is overwhelming.2 
Broadly the Guidelines state that if a suspect admits an offence by the 
time they are arrested then they are entitled to a third off their sen-
tence; if they admit guilt after a trial date is set they can only get a 
quarter off; and if they plead guilty just before the trial starts they can 
receive a tenth off.22
4. What can be negotiated?
Turning back to the South African situation a whole range of possi-
ble outcomes can be negotiated under the practice of plea bargaining 
and it is almost impossible to limit the scope of the negotiations. What 
follows is a list of some of the agreements that could be negotiated 
between the prosecutor and the defence:
9 Goodyear supra (n8) at para 49.
20 Goodyear supra (n8) at para 50.
2 See S Doughty ‘Judges to fight to save softer sentences for guilty pleas’ The Daily 
Mail, 8 January 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/
news/news.html?in_article_id=429825&in_page_id=770, accessed on 3 July 2007. 
22 Ibid.
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(a) A plea to the main charge but on the basis of lesser culpability, i.e. 
admitting dolus eventualis as opposed to dolus directus;
(b) A withdrawal of charges against a co-accused on condition that the 
other accused pleads guilty to the charges;
(c) A conditional withdrawal of a charge based on an undertaking by 
the accused to perform certain duties, for example to attend coun-
selling sessions or to do community work;
(d) A request to the court to dispose of a matter in terms of s 2()(a) 
as opposed to s 2(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act;23
(e) The issuing of a notice in terms of s 57A of the Criminal Procedure 
Act whereby the accused can pay an admission of guilt fine with-
out further appearing in court;
(f) An agreement as to the type of sentence that should be imposed, 
for example a fine, suspended sentence, suspended sentence with 
specific conditions for its suspension;
(g) An undertaking not to seek a sentence of direct imprisonment;
(h) An undertaking to request that the accused would be under 
‘house arrest’ as opposed to direct imprisonment, an application of 
s 276(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act;
(i) An undertaking as to what facts would be revealed to the presiding 
officer.
Given this list it should be obvious that it is almost impossible to stipu-
late every action that could be negotiated or to limit the activities that 
can be dealt with through the application of plea bargaining. It will be 
up to the prosecutor and the defence to apply their minds to arrive at 
an agreement that benefits the interests of all parties. It follows that an 
examination of the potential benefits to the parties is necessary.
5. Benefits of plea bargaining
Public trials impact on the state, the prosecution, the defence, victims 
of crime and the administration of justice. As will be shown hereafter 
the process of plea bargaining poses benefits to all of these partici-
pants in the criminal justice process.
5.1 State, prosecution and administration of justice
It is a known fact that South Africa’s prisons are severely overcrowded. 
Recent figures indicate that the population of our prisons is standing at 
23 In practice section 2()(a) of Act 5 of 977 finds application when the accused 
is charged with less serious offences. The court acts summarily and the accused on 
conviction may only be sentenced to a maximum fine of R 500 and no direct impris-
onment. Yet in terms of section 2(2) the court would be in a position to impose 
direct imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
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78 000 inmates and that it costs the South African taxpayer an amount 
of R7 per day per inmate to keep them behind bars.24 A large number 
of these prisoners are awaiting trial prisoners.25 Given the crime rate and 
the fiscal realities of South Africa and considering that adversarial trials 
are expensive, time consuming and immensely traumatic for most peo-
ple involved, it should be obvious that the state can financially benefit a 
great deal from the process of plea-bargaining being used to reduce the 
number of awaiting trial prisoners in our prisons.
From the prosecution’s point of view a plea of guilty avoids the 
necessity of a public trial and frees the time of overworked prose-
cutors who can thereafter focus their energies on the more serious 
and complex cases. An added bonus to the prosecution is an assured 
conviction. Prosecutors are also given some flexibility in cases where 
there are multiple accused: by striking a plea bargain with one of the 
accused they are in a position to use that accused against the others 
should such testimony be required.
5.2 Benefits to the accused
The benefits of plea bargaining to the accused are obvious. A public 
trial with all of its traumatic consequences is avoided. Many accused 
but regrettably not all are likely to seize the opportunity of a sec-
ond chance in life that plea bargaining offers. Financially the accused 
and his family benefit as the legal fees that the accused would have 
incurred with a public trial are reduced as the entire proceedings are 
curtailed. No doubt criminal trials are stressful and most people would 
want to avoid one if possible. In tendering a plea bargain accused per-
sons not only avoid any possible social stigmatisation but endure less 
stress and do not have to be frustrated by the slow process of justice. 
Plea bargaining offers accused persons some control over the criminal 
process whether they offer a guilty plea on a less offensive or serious 
charge or simply by allowing them to take control of the way justice is 
dispensed by expediting the trial process and sentencing.
5.3 Benefits to the victim
Plea bargaining if sensitively handled could also be of benefit to the 
victim of crime who will not have to suffer the trauma of being exposed 
to secondary victimisation in court. It is my view that s 05A could be 
24 BMN Balfour ‘Budget vote address in the National Assembly by Mr BMN (Ngconde) 
Balfour, MP, Minister of Correctional Services’, 5 June 2004, available at http://www.
info.gov.za/speeches/2004/040654500.htm, accessed on 3 July 2007.
25 At March 2006 there were 48 807 awaiting trial detainees. See the National Prosecut-
ing Authority Annual Report 2005/2006 op cit (n0) 27 for statistics.
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interpreted to mean that a victim would have the right to request that 
the matter should go to trial in cases where they elect to find closure 
by way of the trial process.
Section 05A is one of the few provisions in the CPA that recognises 
the interests of the victim in a formal way. Section 05A()(b)(iii) pro-
vides as follows:
(b)  The prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in paragraph 
(a) —
 (i)  after consultation with the person charged with the investigation of 
the case;
 (ii)  with due regard to, at least, the —
     (aa)  nature of and circumstances relating to the offence;
     (bb)    personal circumstances of the accused;
     (cc)     previous convictions of the accused, if any; and
     (dd)    interests of the community, and
   (iii)  after affording the complainant or his or her representative, where 
it is reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and 
circumstances relating to the offence and the interests of the com-
plainant, the opportunity to make representations to the prosecutor 
regarding —
    (aa)        the contents of the agreement; and
    (bb)       the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to com-
pensation or the rendering to the complainant of some spe-
cific benefit or service in lieu of compensation for damage or 
pecuniary loss.
Although some prosecutors may have given victims the opportunity to 
comment on plea negotiations pre-200 there was no provision that 
compelled prosecutors to do so. This provision at the least gives victims 
of crime the opportunity to make representations to the prosecutor in 
qualified circumstances. By making provision for victim participation the 
provision aims at fairness towards the accused and also the victim and 
hence it also serves the broader interests of justice and society.26 Further-
more, giving victims a say in the plea bargaining process enhances the 
transparency of the process and removes the notion that plea bargaining 
serves only the interest of the accused who has committed the crime.27
6. Determining a ‘just sentence’
Negotiating a settlement agreement is only one part of the plea bar-
gaining process. Section 05A(8) provides that before an accused can 
be convicted on a charge in terms of the section a presiding officer 
26 See E du Toit, F de Jager, SE van der Merwe, A Paizes and A St. Q Skeen Commentary 
on the Criminal Procedure Act (99) 5-. See also PM Bekker ‘Plea bargaining in 
the United States and South Africa’ (996) 29 CILSA 68 at 209.
27 See S v Sassin [2003] 4 All SA 506 (NC) at 50. 
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must determine whether the negotiated sentence is ‘just’, the interpre-
tation of which is not without its difficulties.
Section 05A(8) reads as follows:
‘If the court is satisfied that the sentence agreement is just, the court shall 
inform the prosecutor and the accused that the court is so satisfied, where-
upon the court shall convict the accused of the offence charged and sen-
tence the accused in accordance with the sentence agreement.’
One of the significant aspects of the provision is that the legislature 
preferred the use of the word ‘just’28 as opposed to ‘appropriate sen-
tence’. In the Sassin case the court considered the meaning of the word 
‘just’ and consulted the Oxford English Dictionary which defines ‘just’ 
as ‘morally right and fair, appropriate or deserved’.29 The Afrikaans text 
however uses the term ‘regverdig’. The Afrikaans Verklarende Hand-
woordeboek defines ‘regverdig’ as ‘in ooreenstemming met wat reg is, 
regmatig, onpartydig, billik, eerlik’.30 At first glance it might appear 
that the legislature simply opted for the use of plain English, but in my 
opinion the word ‘just’ was particularly chosen in order to compel the 
presiding officer to not only consider an appropriate sentence based 
on the nature of the offence but to take other factors into consideration 
in sentencing in terms of this provision.
What I believe is envisaged by the choice of the word ‘just’ as opposed 
to appropriate is that the presiding officer should firstly exercise a true 
sentencing discretion, which is to consider the traditional factors that 
play a role at sentencing, namely the circumstances of the accused, the 
nature of the offence and the interest of society.3 Secondly, to take into 
account that the sentence agreement is based on a host of practical and 
factual considerations to which only the state and defence are privy.
As can be seen, the distinction between ‘appropriate’ and ‘just’ would be 
that a presiding officer has to consider more than the traditional factors in 
order to determine the justness of a sentence. Els J put it aptly when he said:
‘The function of the court in considering the justness or unjustness of a plea 
and sentence agreement made under s 05A encompasses the following:
.  The consideration of the well-known triad as set out in S v Zinn 969 
(2) SA 537 (A).
2.  The taking of a broad overview of the facts admitted and the crimes 
admitted to having been committed together with the proposed sentence 
to be imposed, all with a view to establishing whether the sentence 
28 Also see Zwiegelaar v Zwiegelaar 200 () SA 208 (SCA) at 22H, Haysom v Addi-
tional Magistrate, Cape Town and Another; S v Haysom 979 (3) SA 55 (C) at 6 
and S v Lovell 972 (3) SA 760 (A) for views on the interpretation of the word ‘just’, 
albeit in another context.
29 Sassin supra (n27) at para 5.7.
30 Ibid.
3 See S v Zinn 969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
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agreed upon and its effective content bear an adequate enough relation-
ship to the crimes committed taking into account all of the agreed facts, 
both aggravating and mitigating, so that it can be said that justice has 
been served.32
7. Impact on the South African criminal justice system
Having obtained a better understanding of the types and nature of plea 
bargains that can be negotiated and the benefits that accrue in utilizing 
the process, we can now look in closer detail at the application and 
effectiveness of plea bargaining in South Africa.
With all the benefits for the state and the other parties to the process, 
it is disconcerting that the prosecution in 2005/2006 only succeeded in 
2 64 cases in reaching a plea and sentence agreement.33 Plea bargain-
ing also received very little acknowledgement in the National Pros-
ecuting Authority Annual Report. In order to get a clearer picture of 
the usefulness of the procedure I turned to the office of the National 
Prosecuting Authority for the statistics they had on plea bargaining 
since its statutory inception in 200.34
What follows is a breakdown of the statistics showing the use of 
s 05A by all of the jurisdictional divisions and the percentage of 
offences that it was used for:
32 S v Esterhuizen 2005 () SACR 490 (T) at 494-495.
33 See National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2005/2006 op cit (n0) 27.
34 I am indebted to Advocate J Schutte of the National Prosecuting Services who assisted 
me by providing a comprehensive document with regard to the statistics kept by the 
prosecution service in all of the jurisdictional divisions.











An analysis of the abovementioned statistics show that plea and sen-
tence agreements were used predominantly by the prosecutors in the 
Western Cape. In some of the jurisdictional divisions no plea bargain-
ing took place. In view of the benefits of plea bargaining it was nec-
essary to enquire from the Prosecuting Authority why they so seldom 
made use of the process. The response of the Prosecuting Authority 
was that:
‘The plea bargaining concept is still quite new to the prosecution as well as 
to the defence. The impact of plea and sentence agreements is being influ-
enced by various factors, such as:
(i) Some divisions do not follow the route of s 05A of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act, as they rather follow s 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
which is not so time consuming. Complainants and investigating officers 
must be consulted before the prosecutor may accept a plea agreement.
(ii)  Attorneys and prosecutors in some regions are short of personnel and 
do not have sufficient time to properly consult on the agreements/disa-
greements;
(iii)  Willingness by the accused and/or their legal representatives has a great 
impact on the number of agreements; and
(iv)  Plea agreements cannot be concluded in all cases. It depends on the 
merits and circumstances of each case whether a plea and sentence 
agreement might be possible.
In addition to the reasons given, the Western Cape has so many plea agree-
ments as dedicated prosecutors deal with the agreements.’ 35
35 Advocate J Schutte in a letter addressed to the author, dated 25 August 2006. 
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The reasons given in (iii) and (iv) seem convincing but those men-
tioned under (i) and (ii) are far less convincing. I will now deal with 
the reasons submitted by the office of the National Prosecuting Author-
ity for not sufficiently resorting to plea bargaining in all of the divisions 
and the fact that a lack of time to consult on plea and sentence agree-
ments impacts on the use of the procedure.
The aim of s 05A is not only to regulate the negotiations between 
the state and the defence but also to empower victims of crime. As 
stated above s 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act places no obligation 
on the state to consult with victims when they accept a plea of guilty, 
it is therefore the task of the National Prosecuting Authority to issue 
clear directives to prosecutors to be sensitive to the needs of victims 
and for the sake of transparency to use s 05A rather than to negotiate 
pleas with counsel in chambers. Whilst it might not always be practical 
in each and every case where an accused pleads guilty to make use 
of the provision there should be an attempt to make use of the proce-
dure more often. If the application of s 05A is cumbersome and time 
consuming then consideration should be given to amendments to the 
procedure to make it more effective and efficient.
This brings me to the issue that some attorneys and prosecutors in 
some divisions do not have sufficient time to properly consult on the 
sentence agreements. To me it appears that there is an oversight by the 
prosecutors and the practitioners as to the purpose of consultation in 
general. One of the purposes of a consultation would be to determine 
the length of the trial and in order to determine that a consultation is 
needed. Furthermore it is the duty of each and every prosecutor to con-
sult with witnesses, not only to prepare them for the trial but to serve 
justice. It is my submission that prosecutors will fail in their duties if 
they do not make sufficient time to consult with witnesses prior to the 
trial and that witnesses will be denied an opportunity to voice their 
opinions on what they consider fair and just. Lastly, prosecutors are 
obligated in terms of the National Prosecuting Policy to do so.36
8. Challenges
The greatest challenge facing the concept of plea-bargaining is that it 
carries with it an inherent risk that accused are not equally treated and 
hence that there is no equal protection before the law.
36 See National Prosecuting Authority National Prosecuting Authority of SA, National 
Prosecution Policy at page 6: ‘An offer by the defence of a plea of guilty on fewer 
charges or on a lesser charge may be acceptable, provided that — where appropriate, 
the views of the complainant and the police as well as the interests of justice, includ-
ing the need to avoid a protracted trial, have been taken into account.’
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Section 05A provides for the state and the accused’s legal repre-
sentative to enter into a plea and sentence agreement. By implication 
all of those who are without legal representation would be excluded 
from the benefits of the procedure. It is therefore no surprise that plea 
bargaining has been viewed in South Africa as a process that will only 
benefit the rich. This perception is reinforced when the likes of Mark 
Thatcher, Roger Kebble and members of parliament appear to success-
fully bargain their way out of prison.37
Most of the accused appearing in the lower courts are indigent and 
cannot afford representation and accordingly the process provides no 
benefit for them despite the fact that ideally they would be the main 
beneficiaries of a plea bargain. Our Constitution38 provides for a fair 
trial in terms of s 35(3) and that should include the right to receive 
equal treatment. It can be argued that the plea bargaining procedure 
as presently practiced in South Africa results in a significant portion 
of our population not receiving equal protection before the law. With 
more and more impoverished South Africans continuing to increase 
their demands for an improvement to many facets of their lives, the 
time will soon arrive when unrepresented accused challenge the con-
stitutionality of the plea bargaining legislation. One can only wonder if 
s 05A will survive constitutional scrutiny in the years to come.
9. Conclusion
In conclusion it can be unequivocally stated that the process of plea-
bargaining remains an effective instrument that eases the burden on 
different justice systems and provides flexibility in sentencing.
In South Africa urgent intervention is needed to reduce the large 
case backlog in all our courts and to address the burgeoning number 
of awaiting trial prisoners. Without plea bargaining the effectiveness of 
the South African criminal justice system will be further compromised, 
a sentiment shared by Uijs AJ in North Western Dense Concrete CC v 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape)39 where he said: ‘I am 
of the view that the system of criminal justice in South Africa would 
probably break down if the procedure of plea bargaining were not fol-
lowed because it had become the subject of judicial disapproval.’40
Like most processes plea-bargaining does have its shortcomings and 
there is the potential for abuse. Given the extraordinary powers of 
37 W Hartley ‘NPA defends ‘strategic’ deal with Thatcher’ Business Day, 3 October 2005, 
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=69859, 
accessed on 3 July 2007.
38 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 996.
39 999 (2) SACR 669 (C).
40 North Western Dense Concrete CC supra (n39) at 676.
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the prosecution service in exercising prosecutorial discretion in South 
Africa it is important to be aware of the potential danger of prosecu-
tors abusing their powerful positions to negotiate inappropriate agree-
ments by threatening accused persons with the maximum sentence 
that could be imposed. In light of the aforesaid, plea bargaining does 
pose a risk of innocent people electing to admit guilt to avoid maxi-
mum punishment rather than taking the risk of defending themselves 
through the trial process.
In the final analysis however, there can be no debate that in the cur-
rent South African situation the benefits of the process of plea-bargain-
ing to all parties in the criminal justice system far outweigh the short-
comings and concerns about potential abuse. The process is simply 
not intended nor deserving of being labelled unethical and offensive. 
If aggressively yet judiciously applied the process of plea-bargaining 
may well emerge as the saviour of a crumbling administration of justice 
in South Africa.
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